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he sovereign debt crisis has degenerated into a banking crisis. This was perfectly 
predictable. A sovereign debt crisis always leads to a banking crisis. Yet policy-makers 
did not see it coming, or if they did see it, they failed to act in time.  
We now hear that the solution is a massive and quick recapitalisation of banks. But who can 
recapitalise the eurozone banks quickly? In the present bearish conditions in the equity 
markets, only governments can quickly garner the financial resources necessary for this 
recapitalisation. But in order to do so, governments will have to issue more debt. The result 
of this is predictable: the creditworthiness of governments will deteriorate. Inevitably, this 
will intensify the sovereign debt crisis, feeding back into the balance sheets of the banks that 
hold the bonds of those who are supposed to save them.  
Recapitalising banks made sense during the banking crisis of 2008 when governments had 
debt burdens significantly lower than today. Today governments cannot recapitalise banks 
without triggering downgrades and renewed fears of sovereign default. This leads to a 
vicious circle: recapitalisations undermine the creditworthiness of governments, and this 
feeds back into the banks, which see the value of their assets (government bonds) decline 
further. The more governments recapitalise the more the value of the banks’ assets declines 
leading to the need for further recapitalisations. A never-ending story. 
In order to stop this downward spiral, a floor has to be put on the prices of government 
bonds in the eurozone. The European Central Bank (ECB) is the only institution capable of 
imposing such a floor and breaking the vicious circle.   
In order to achieve such a result, the ECB should announce that it stands ready to intervene 
in the government bond markets to prevent further declines in bond prices. The ECB is the 
only institution capable of doing so, because it has unlimited firing power. That is, it can 
create money without limit. In announcing its unconditional commitment, it can stop the 
vicious circle. And when investors are convinced of the resolve of the ECB, they will stop 
selling sovereign bonds because they trust that a floor has been imposed on their prices. The 
beauty of this outcome produced by confidence is that the ECB will not have to buy 
government bonds anymore.  
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Today the ECB does not reap this benefit because it has made it clear that it thoroughly 
dislikes being a lender of last resort and that it will stop as soon as possible.  Why would 
bondholders, who are uncertain about the future value of their bonds, stop selling these 
when the ECB gives a signal that it does not trust these bonds either?  
In theory the central bank should only buy the bonds of illiquid but solvent governments. It 
is easy to see that this rule excludes Greece, but it does not exclude the other countries’ bond 
markets. In these markets, fear has driven the interest rates to such high levels that, if 
maintained, they will make any government insolvent. It is in these markets that the ECB 
must intervene with a clear commitment.  
Many objections are raised against the idea that the ECB should act as a lender of last resort 
in the government bond markets. One objection is that this amounts to monetary financing of 
budget deficits and thus will lead to inflation. This is unfounded. When the ECB buys 
government bonds in the secondary markets, it provides liquidity, not to governments, but 
to the financial institutions that sold the sovereign bonds. In addition, when these financial 
institutions sell the government bonds, they are in search of a safe asset, and this is primarily 
central bank money. The latter is hoarded and is not used to expand credit and the money 
supply, and thus does not lead to inflationary pressures.  
The only reasonable objection to a lender-of-last-resort role for the ECB is moral hazard. By 
announcing its readiness to provide liquidity in the government bond markets, the ECB 
creates the risk that governments may reduce their efforts at reducing deficits and debts. 
That is why binding rules forcing governments to bring their budgetary houses in order 
must complement the ECB’s role of lender of last resort. These rules are now being put in 
place.  
The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) (and in the future, the ESM), is no substitute 
for the ECB. There are two reasons for this. First, the EFSF (ESM) will not be capable of acting 
quickly during crisis situations because its governance is based on the unanimity rule. This 
will paralyse it when quick action is required. Second, even a doubling or quadrupling of its 
resources will not help. The reason is that when resources are finite, investors and 
speculators will quickly find out that there are states of nature that will deplete these 
resources. As a result, the credibility of the EFSF (ESM) will be weak. This weakness can in 
principle be solved by transforming the EFSF into a bank with unlimited access to the ECB 
liquidity. But this solution puts the ECB again at centre stage.  
The ECB has no excuse anymore not to act. Whether it acts directly or indirectly through the 
EFSF (ESM) does not make much difference. The ECB is the only institution that can avoid a 
banking crisis, and this can only be achieved today by acting in the government bond 
markets of the eurozone countries.  
Finally, the fact that bank recapitalisations will not solve the present banking crisis in the 
eurozone does not mean that in the long run banks will not have to increase their capital 
ratios. Such increases will be necessary to make banks more resilient to avoid future crises. 
Today, however, the overriding problem is to put a floor on the price of government bonds; 
otherwise, recapitalisations will be as effective as pouring water into a leaky bucket.  